We identify a positive causal effect of workplace diversity on corporate innovation, using the staggered adoption of U.S. state-level Employment Non-Discrimination Acts (ENDAs) that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. We find a significant increase in patents and patent citations for firms headquartered in states that have passed ENDAs relative to firms headquartered in states that have not. This result is more pronounced for firms that previously have not implemented progay non-discrimination policies, for firms in states with a large homosexual population, and for firms in human capital-intensive industries. Lastly, we provide evidence that ENDAs affect innovation through the mechanism of matching firms with certain types of employees: following the enactment of ENDAs, more pro-gay (anti-gay) employees, who are generally more (less) creative, relocate into (out of) the adopting states. Overall, our findings support the view that inclusion inspires innovation.
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The best way to ensure the development of new ideas is through a diverse and inclusive workforce.
Forbes Insights (2011)
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that workplace diversity fosters corporate innovation. For example, in an oped piece in the Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2013, Tim Cook, Apple's CEO, urges Congress to amend the federal civil rights law to ban sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, arguing that workplace equality is important for business creativity. He states, "Embracing people's individuality is a matter of basic human dignity and civil rights. It also turns out to be great for the creativity that drives our business.
1 " Despite some circumstantial examples, there is little empirical evidence on how workplace diversity influences corporate innovation. In this paper, we fill this gap and reveal a positive causal effect of workplace diversity on firms' innovation.
Our empirical identification strategy is based on the staggered passage of U.S. state-level Employment Non-Discrimination Acts (ENDAs) that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. We use the passage of ENDAs to capture an exogenous increase in workplace diversity with respect to sexual orientation. In this paper, we choose to focus on this particular dimension of diversity mainly for identification purpose. In the U.S., the 1964 Civil Rights Act has already banned the discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, and national origin at the national level. For this reason, studying workplace diversity with respect to these dimensions is empirically difficult because the law change is nationwide and too early for data availability.
Our setting of employing the staggered passage of ENDAs is highly appealing from an empirical standpoint for two reasons. First, the motivation behind ENDAs centers around state courts' determination to address a persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, and to reinforce the commitment to fairness and equal opportunity in the workplace. As ENDAs were not passed with the intention of promoting innovation, potential effects on innovation are likely to be an unintended consequence of these laws. Second, the staggered adoption of ENDAs in several U.S. states enables us to identify their effects in a difference-in-differences framework.
Because multiple shocks affect different firms exogenously at different times, we can avoid the common identification difficulty faced by studies with a single shock: the potential biases and noise coinciding with the shock that directly affects corporate innovation (Roberts and Whited, 2012) .
We expect ENDAs to foster corporate innovation through the mechanism of the matching process between firms and their employees. Currently, the U.S. population is divided in their attitudes on homosexuals. In general, those who are more likely to be pro-gay are younger, better educated, more
tolerant, more open-minded, more risk-taking, have diverse backgrounds, and exhibit a stronger ideological liberalism. Further, these types of people also tend to be more creative. In contrast, those who are older, more conservative, and exhibit a stronger religiosity tend to be anti-gay (Barth and Overby, 2003; Herek 1994; Lewis and Gossett, 2008; Wilcox and Wolpert, 2000) . After a state adopts the ENDA, more pro-gay individuals tend to relocate into that state, while more anti-gay individuals tend to leave for other states. Because the pro-gay individuals are likely to be more creative than the anti-gay ones, corporate innovation is subsequently enhanced.
Using a panel of 58,009 U.S. public firms from 1976 to 2008 and a difference-in-differences approach, we show that an exogenous increase in workplace diversity subsequently leads to a significant increase in innovation outputs. On average, firms headquartered in states that passed this employment anti-discrimination law experienced an increase in the number of patents by 8% and an increase in the number of patent citations by 11%, relative to firms headquartered in states that did not pass such a law.
The identifying assumption central to a causal interpretation of the difference-in-differences estimation is that treated and control firms share parallel trends prior to the law changes. Our tests show that their pre-treatment trends are indeed indistinguishable. Moreover, most of the impact of ENDAs on innovation occurs three years after the laws' enactment, which suggests a causal effect.
However, it is possible that the adoption of ENDAs is triggered by local business conditions that in turn increase firms' innovation. To mitigate this concern, we additionally control for local business conditions such as state GDP, population, education, and political balance. Our inferences are largely unchanged. In further tests, we exploit the fact that economic conditions are likely to be similar in neighboring states, whereas the effects of ENDAs stop at state borders. This discontinuity in ENDAs allows us to difference away any unobserved confounding factors as long as they affect both the treated state and its neighbors. By comparing treated firms to their immediate neighbors, we can better identify how much of the observed innovation change is due to ENDAs rather than other shocks to local business conditions. When we difference away changes in local business conditions by focusing on treated and control firms closely located on either side of a state border, we continue to find a significant increase in firms' innovation after their states pass ENDAs, relative to their neighboring firms. These results indicate that the observed increase in innovation following the enactment of ENDAs is not driven by local economic shocks.
To provide further evidence that the effects of ENDAs on innovation are indeed tied to workplace diversity, we apply a double difference-in-differences approach to examine heterogeneous treatment effects. We find that the treatment effects are stronger for firms that previously did not implement pro-gay non-discrimination policies, for firms that are in states with a large homosexual population, and for firms that operate in human capital-intensive industries. These cross-sectional variations in the treatment effects further increase our confidence that the impact of ENDAs on innovation is indeed related to workplace diversity with respect to sexual orientation.
Finally, we examine the relocation decisions of individual employees, and investigate whether the matching process between firms and employees is indeed the mechanism through which ENDAs affect innovation. We find that, following the adoption of an ENDA, the adopting state experiences a greater inflow of inventors from other states while simultaneously experiencing a greater outflow of existing inventors to other states. We further find that the inventors who move out of the state mainly move to states that have not adopted ENDAs and that the inventors who move into the state are from all over the country, regardless of whether their states of origin adopted an ENDA or not. These results suggest that the enactment of ENDAs triggers a workforce rebalancing. The pro-gay (anti-gay) employees are more (less) willing to work in the state after the state adopts the ENDA. We further show that, at the individual level, the moving-in inventors are more productive at patenting than the moving-out ones, which is consistent with the view that pro-gay individuals tend to be more creative than anti-gay individuals.
This paper provides at least four major contributions to existing literature. First, our paper adds to the studies that examine the drivers of corporate innovation. This strand of literature is important for the economy, as Lerner and Seru (2015) point out (p. 2): "Not only is innovation critical in many cases to firm survival-witness the fates of firms which failed to successfully innovate, such as Kodak, Motorola, and Xerox-but it illustrates the critical issues that motivate corporate finance theory more generally.
Topics such as uncertainty, information asymmetries, and the intangibility of assets are central when it comes to financing innovative firms and projects." Current research on this topic has focused on factors such as incentive compensation for management (Manso, 2011) , institutional ownership (Aghion et al., 2013) , anti-takeover provisions (Atanassov, 2013) , access to the equity market (Hsu et al., 2013) , information environment (He and Tian, 2013) , employees' job security (Acharya et al., 2014) , etc.
Although these studies enhance our understanding of the mechanisms that motivate firms to innovate, the role of firms' work environment is largely overlooked. This lack of evidence makes it difficult to fully understand the drivers of corporate innovation, given that innovative ideas arise usually when employees communicate, share ideas, and collaborate with their peers (Cross et al., 2007; Spender and Strong, 2012) .
Our paper helps to fill this gap by documenting an inclusive workforce as an important driver of innovation.
Second, our study sheds light on the real consequences of labor market discrimination. Since
Becker's (1957) seminal work, the subject of labor market discrimination has been an important research area in the economics literature. While most studies on discrimination focus on documenting the existence of unfair treatment of women, minorities, and homosexuals in the workplace, the real economic cost of discrimination is relatively under-explored. Our paper suggests that discrimination in the labor market imposes significant costs on the economy by decreasing corporate innovativeness.
Third, our paper is broadly related to the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR), in which employment diversity is one of its main components. Despite the growing importance of CSR in U.S. firms' operations, the effect of CSR on firm performance is still under debate. One group of researchers argues that CSR results in positive effects because focusing on the interests of other stakeholders increases their willingness to support a firm's operation, which in turn increases the firm's performance (Deng et al., 2013; Jensen, 2001) . In contrast, other groups of researchers believe that CSR is a wealth transfer from shareholders to other stakeholders and thus reduces firm performance (Cronqvist et al., 2009; Friedman, 1970; Pagano and Volpin, 2005) . Our paper establishes a new channel through which CSR affects firm value. The findings in this paper show that CSR (in particular, an inclusive and diverse employment policy) is beneficial in the case of innovation, which requires heavy investment in human capital, and a tolerant and inclusive workforce (Holmstrom, 1989) .
Lastly, our paper has important policy implications. Though Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides comprehensive nationwide protection from discrimination based on race, color, national origin, gender, and religion, adding sexual minorities to that list remains a controversial topic across the U.S. While more than 20 of the 50 U.S. states have offered full legal protection, legislators in the remaining states are still debating whether or not to follow suit, partially because the impacts of these anti-discrimination laws on the society and economy are still unclear. Our paper provides evidence that the passage of this legislation fosters creativity in the workplace.
Hypothesis Development
Individual workers relocate for many reasons including employment, education, economic opportunities, as well as feelings of safety, security, and a sense of belonging (Hagelskamp et al., 2010) .
Anti-gay prejudice often creates an environment where homosexuals lack a sense of belonging, frequently resulting in a desire for them to relocate to gay-friendly communities (McCallum and McLaren, 2011; Weston, 1995) . Gorman-Murray (2007) and Rosenfeld and Kim (2005) find that sexual orientation is an important factor for homosexuals' decision to relocate, which usually involves such individuals moving from a location with greater sexual orientation discrimination to a location with less sexual orientation discrimination. Therefore, a state that passes an ENDA would become more attractive for homosexuals.
Suppose that two types of workers are affected by ENDAs: the pro-gay workers and the anti-gay workers. The pro-gay workers include homosexuals and their heterosexual allies. The anti-gay workers include those who hold a prejudice against homosexuals and derive disutility when working with them.
ENDAs promote gay rights and enhance homosexuals' employment opportunities in the workplace. Thus, we expect that more pro-gay workers will relocate to the state after the state adopts the ENDA. In contrast, for anti-gay workers, greater gay rights and more pro-gay employees decrease their utility and make them more likely to relocate to a place without adopting such a law. In summary, following the state's adoption of an ENDA, we expect that more pro-gay employees relocate to this state and more antigay employees relocate out of this state. Supporting this argument, Klawitter and Flatt (1998) provide evidence that homosexuals tend to work in states that have adopted ENDAs, and Florida (2011) documents a negative association between the concentration of gay and anti-gay populations.
Based on U.S. census data, Black et al. (2000) investigate the demographics of the homosexual population in the U.S. and find that, on average, homosexuals are better educated than heterosexuals.
Kanazawa (2012) provides evidence that more intelligent individuals are more likely to engage in homosexual behavior. Moreover, among heterosexuals, those more likely to be pro-gay are younger, better educated, more tolerant, more open-minded, more risk-taking, have more diverse backgrounds, and exhibit a stronger ideological liberalism than those more likely to be anti-gay, which includes older people, more conservative people, and people with stronger religiosity (see, for example, Barth and Overby, 2003; Herek, 1994; Lewis and Gossett, 2008; Wilcox and Wolpert, 2000) . Existing literature also finds that the personal attributes of pro-gay individuals listed above positively contribute to creativity and that the attributes listed above for anti-gay individuals are usually negatively associated with creativity (Bénabou et al., 2015; Florida, 2003; Jacoby, 1967; Merrotsy, 2013; Oldham and Cummings, 1996) .
Therefore, we expect the pro-gay group to be, on average, more innovative than the anti-gay group.
In summary, the above discussion leads to our prediction that corporate innovation increases after the adoption of ENDAs. Moreover, the mechanism through which ENDAs affect innovation is the relocation of pro-gay employees (who are likely to be more creative) into the state and the relocation of anti-gay employees (who are likely to be less creative) out of the state.
Institutional Details
Background on Sexual Orientation Discrimination
People who have a homosexual orientation account for a nontrivial part of the U.S. population. According to a review conducted by the Williams Institute at UCLA School of Law (Gates, 2011) 
Adopting Process of ENDAs
The enactment of ENDAs reflects the sustained efforts of gay rights activists, who campaigned for the laws despite years of legislative defeats. For example, New York did not adopt such a law until more than 30 years after it was first introduced into the legislative debate (Sears et al., 2009) . These defeats are due to strong opponents from conservative political and religious groups. These opponents have advanced two conflicting arguments in political debates: (1) protection for homosexuals is not necessary as they do not face pejorative treatment in the labor market, and (2) there will be a flood of complaints that will overwhelm state agencies following the laws' enactment. In contrast, proponents of such laws have insisted that there is a need for protection of homosexuals from discrimination and that any discrimination is unjust and should be remedied (Rubenstein, 2002 It is worth noting that Clarenbach's strategy was a classic one, which was widely followed by other regions in the U.S. to adopt ENDAs (Button et al., 1997) . As summarized in Haider-Markel and
Meier (2003), the successful adoption of ENDAs largely depends on skillful work by political elites, wellorganized gay rights groups, and the absence of significant opposition groups. None of these factors seem to be directly related to an individual firm's patenting activities. Moreover, the primary purpose of ENDAs is to promote gays' rights of fairness and equality, rather than stimulate economy growth.
Therefore, the staggered adoption of ENDAs is unlikely to be triggered by factors that drive corporate innovation.
Sample Formation and Variable Construction
The Sample
We retrieve patent and patent citation data from the worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT, April 2012) and financial information from Compustat. 4 We then obtain the firm's headquarter information from Compustat, Compact Disclosure (which records headquarters' changes), and manually check any missing information.
We assume that firms produce zero patents if they are not matched with PATSTAT. Patents are included in the database only if they are eventually granted. Given the average of a two-year lag between patent application and patent grant, and that the latest year in the database is 2011, patents that were applied for in 2009 and 2010 may not appear in the database. Following the suggestion by Hall et al. (2001) , we end our sample period in 2008.
We exclude the firms that are incorporated outside the U.S., and exclude firms in the financial industry (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utility industry (SIC codes 4900-4999) due to the differences in regulatory oversight for these industries. Following Bloom et al. (2013) , we further drop firms that never filed a single patent during our entire sample period. Our final sample consists of 58,009 firm-year observations (4,915 unique firms) from 1976 to 2008.
It is worth mentioning that the quality of the PATSTAT database is at least as good as that of the NBER patent database (which has been widely used in the innovation literature). Moshirian et al. (2014) compare the U.S. patent coverage in both databases, and find that they are generally comparable, except
for a large decline in the number of patents from the NBER database over the [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] period. This difference is because many patent applications filed during this period were still under review and had not been granted by 2006 when the NBER database ended. However, the PATSTAT database does not suffer from this problem because it continues to include granted patents up to 2011. 
Innovation Variables
To assess the success of long-term investment in corporate innovation, we employ five innovation measures based on patent counts and patent citations. The use of patenting to measure a firm's innovativeness has been widely used in the literature since Scherer (1965) and Griliches (1981) .
The first measure of innovation is the number of patents filed (and subsequently granted) by a firm in a given year. Our second measure of innovation is the sum of citation counts across all patents filed by the firm in a given year, which captures the significance of the patent outputs. Because citations are received for many years after a patent is created, patents created near the end of the sample period have less time to accumulate citations. To address this truncation bias, we follow the recommendations of Hall et al. (2001 Hall et al. ( , 2005 and scale the citation count of each patent by the average citation count of all firms' patents that are filed in the same year.
Moreover, we employ citations per patent as the third measure of innovation to capture the patent's quality. Lastly, given that we are interested in determining whether or not workplace discrimination affects employees' productivity in innovative projects, we use patents and citations per employee as our last two innovation measures. Due to the high level of skewness of patent data, we use natural logarithms of the innovation variables.
Other Control Variables
We control for a vector of firm and industry characteristics that may affect a firm's innovation productivity, and these controls are motivated by prior literature (e.g., Fang et al., 2014; He and Tian, 2013) . These variables include firm size, firm age, asset tangibility, leverage, cash holding, R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, ROA, Tobin's Q, and industry concentration (the Herfindahl index based on sales). Following Aghion et al. (2005) , we also include the squared Herfindahl index in our regressions to mitigate non-linear effects of product market competition on innovation outputs. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 6 To minimize the effect of outliers, we winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Our average sample firms have book value assets of $2.49 billion, hire more than 9,000 employees, and are 16 years old. They hold a sizeable amount of cash with a cash ratio of 20% of total assets. The average R&D and capital expenditure account for 7% and 6% of total assets, respectively. The average firms are moderately levered with a book leverage ratio of 20%, and tangible assets account for 26% of total assets in the average firms. In terms of performance, sample firms perform well with an average ROA of 7% and Tobin's Q of 2.13.
Summary Statistics
Empirical Results
Visual Illustration
Figure 1 depicts the effects of ENDAs on innovation in states that adopt the policy change relative to states that do not adopt the policy change. We follow Autor et al. (2006) and Acharya et al. (2014) in constructing this graph. The y-axis shows the logarithm of the number of patents or citations received to patents filed in a given year; the x-axis shows the time relative to the adoption of the anti-discrimination laws, ranging from five years prior to the adoption year (year 0) until ten years afterwards.
The plots demonstrate the point estimates of the coefficients from the following regression:
where i indexes firm, s indexes the state in which the firms' headquarters are located, and t indexes the year. _ , + is a dummy variable indicating the year relative to the adoption of the ENDA in state s and year t. 7 The two plots in Figure 1 correspond to the number of patents and citations, respectively, and they show the same pattern. Innovation increases significantly after the adoption of ENDAs. For example, in the year prior to the law adoption, the −1 coefficient is approximately 0.02 for patents, while in five years after the law adoption, the corresponding 5 coefficient is more than six times as large (0.013). In terms of patent citations, the −1 coefficient is approximately 0.08; in contrast, the corresponding 5 coefficient is three times as large (0.25). Moreover, we observe that the greatest increase in innovation appears several years after the law adoption, suggesting that the passage of ENDAs has a persistent long-run effect.
Baseline Regression
Several U.S. state courts adopted the ENDAs in different years during the sample period. Thus, we can examine the before-after effect of the change in ENDAs in affected states (the treatment group) compared to the before-after effect in states in which such a change was not effected (the control group). This is a difference-in-differences test design in multiple treatment groups and multiple time periods as employed by Acharya et al. (2014) , Atanassov (2013) , Bertrand et al. (2004) , and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
We implement this test through the following regression:
where i indexes firm, s indexes the state in which the firms' headquarters are located, and t indexes the year. The dependent variable is a proxy for innovation performance. The variable Pass is a dummy variable that equals one if the ENDA is in place in state s in a given year, and zero otherwise. We include a set of control variables that may affect a firm's innovation output, as discussed in Section 4. The year fixed effects enable us to control for intertemporal technological shocks, as well as the fact that citations to patents applied for in later years would be, on average, lower than those in earlier years. Similarly, the firm fixed effects also allow us to control for time-invariant differences in patenting and citation practices across firms. Following Acharya et al. (2014) , we also control for regional time trends through the interaction of region dummies with year dummies. 8 These interactions enable us to nonparametrically account for time-varying differences between geographic regions of the U.S. in corporate innovation and in the enactment of ENDAs. Given that our treatment is defined at the state level, we cluster standard errors by state.
The coefficient of interest in this model is the 1 coefficient. As explained by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), the employed fixed effects lead to 1 being estimated as the within-state differences before and after the anti-discrimination law change as opposed to similar before-after differences in states that did not experience such a change during the same period.
It is helpful to consider an example. Suppose we want to estimate the effect of the ENDA passed in Minnesota in 1993 on innovation. We can subtract the number of innovations before the law adoption from the number of innovations after the law adoption for firms headquartered in Minnesota. However, economy-wide shocks may occur at the same time and affect corporate innovations in 1993. To difference away such factors, we calculate the same difference in innovations for firms in a control state that does not adopt such a law. Finally, we calculate the difference between these two differences, which represents the incremental effect of the law change on firms in Minnesota compared to firms in the control state. (1+patents) and we find that the coefficient estimate on the Pass indicator is 0.076 and significant at the 5% level, suggesting a positive effect of the law change on corporate innovation. The economic magnitude is also sizeable: the adoption of anti-discrimination laws leads to an increase in the number of patents by approximately 7.9% (= e 0.076 − 1).
Examining Ln(1+citations) as the dependent variable in column (2), we find that the coefficient on the Pass indicator is 0.106 and is significant at the 5% level, which implies that the adoption of anti-discrimination laws leads to an increase in the number of patent citations by approximately 11.2% (= e 0.106 − 1).
The positive effects of ENDAs on the number of citations could be driven by either more patents or more citations per patent. To further examine the impact of each patent, we examine the number of citations per patent in column (3) and find that the law adoption has a significant and positive effect on citations per patent. These results indicate that the anti-discrimination law leads to an increase in not only the number of patents but also the impact of the patents.
In columns (4)- (5), we repeat our test using patents and citations scaled by the number of employees. The coefficients on the Pass indicator are 0.095 and 0.117, respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that patents and citations per 1000 employees increase by approximately 9.96% and 12.41%, respectively, in states that adopt the ENDAs as compared to states that do not. Therefore, employees' productivity in innovation increases significantly after the ENDAs are adopted.
With regards to control variables, large firms, firms with large cash holdings, firms with high R&D expenditures, and firms with higher growth potential are more innovative. These results are broadly consistent with prior literature (e.g., Fang et al., 2014; He and Tian, 2013) .
Taken together, these results indicate a positive causal effect of workforce diversity (with respect to sexual orientation) on innovation outputs in terms of both quantity and quality.
The Pre-treatment Trends
The validity of difference-in-differences estimation depends on the parallel trends assumption: absent the ENDAs, treated firms' innovation would have evolved in the same way as that of control firms. Table 4 investigates the pre-trend between the treated group and control group. In particular, we define seven indicates the year in which the law is enacted; year −2 indicates that it is 2 years before the law enactment;
and year +2 indicates that it is 2 years after the law enactment. Then, we re-estimate Equation (2) that it takes a few years to reveal the full impact of ENDAs on corporate innovation. This is understandable given that innovation is usually a long-term process. This result is also consistent with the pattern illustrated in Figure 1 .
Overall, Table 4 shows that the treated group and the control group share a similar trend in innovation prior to the law changes, thus supporting the parallel trends assumption associated with the difference-in-differences estimation. Moreover, Table 4 also indicates that most of the impact of antidiscrimination laws on innovation occurs three years after they are passed, which suggests a causal effect.
Confounding Local Business Conditions
Location is one important common factor that likely induces an association between the passing of anti- to find a significant increase in innovation after the adoption of ENDAs. Table 5 presents our first test. In addition to our usual set of explanatory variables used in Table 3, we also account for various time-varying, state-level variables in our regressions. We control for the political balance in a given state (measured as the ratio of Republican to Democrat state representatives in the House of Representatives). Further, since richer and larger states may have the resources to provide a higher level of innovation and may also be more likely to pass anti-discrimination legislation, we include the logarithm of real GDP in a state. We additionally control the logarithm of annual state population.
Further, investment in education is another factor that may lead to differences in patenting. Therefore, we also control for a state's intellectual resources using the number of degree-granting institutions of higher education, as well as the enrollment in institutions of higher education. Data on both state GDP and population are collected from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Information regarding the number of colleges, college enrollment, and political balance is obtained from the annual Statistical Abstracts from the U.S. Census Bureau.
We find that the adoption of ENDAs continues to have a positive and (statistically and economically) significant impact on corporate innovation. Compared to Table 3 , the coefficient on the Pass dummy becomes a little smaller in columns (1) and (2), but gets bigger in columns (3)-(5). Also, we find that more colleges in a state are (weakly) positively associated with innovation quality in column (3).
Other state-level variables have no significant impact on corporate innovation, probably because we have already controlled for Region×Year FE in the regression.
Although the above test accounts for observable local business conditions, some unobservable local economic shocks may be associated with both the passage of ENDAs and corporate innovation. In our second test, we exploit the discontinuity of ENDAs and examine the innovation change in the treatment firms on the state border relative to their neighboring control firms. The logic is as follows.
Suppose that ENDAs are driven by unobserved changes in local business conditions, and that it is these changes (not the ENDAs) that spur corporate innovation in reality. Then both firms in treated states and their neighbors in untreated states just across the state border would spuriously appear to react to the law changes, because economic conditions, unlike state laws, have a tendency to spill across state borders (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2014) . In this case, the change in innovation in treated firms should be no different from that in the neighboring control firms that are located just across the state border.
To examine this possibility, we match each treated firm to a control firm that is in the same industry (three-digit SIC), is in an adjacent state without passing the ENDA, and is closest to the treated firm in distance. Obviously, treated firms may not necessarily share the same local economic condition with its "closest" control firm if the treated firm is in the middle of a large state. To alleviate this concern, we further require that the distance between the treated firm and its matched untreated firm be within 50 miles. 9 If the distance between the treated firm and its closest control firm is more than 50 miles, we drop this pair from our sample. By doing so, we increase our confidence that our treated firm and control firm are truly close to each other geographically and thus face similar local economic shocks. Then, we reestimate Equation (2) by focusing on this sub-sample of firms across the state border. We also include a pair fixed effect for each pair of treated firms and neighboring control firms. Table 6 presents the results. Restricting our sample to the pairs of neighboring treated and control firms reduces the sample to 7,617 firm-year observations; yet, we still find positive and significant coefficients (at the 1% level) on the Pass indicator in all five columns (except for column (1)). Taking column (2) for example (where patent citations is the dependent variable), the coefficient on Pass is 0.140 9 As a robustness check, we also require the distance between the treated firm and control firm to be within 10, 20, 30, or 100 miles, and our inferences are unchanged.
and is significant at the 1% level, indicating that the number of patent citations increases by approximately 15% in the treated firms relative to untreated firms in the same industry located just on the other side of the state border. The point estimate is even slightly larger than that reported in our baseline regression in column (2) of Table 3 . Overall, these results suggest that unobserved local confounds are unlikely to drive our results.
Double Difference-in-differences Tests
To provide further evidence that the effects of ENDAs on innovation are indeed tied to diversity, in this subsection we implement double difference-in-differences tests to examine the heterogeneous treatment effects. Examining heterogeneous treatment effects can further help to alleviate the concern that some omitted firm or state variables are driving our results, because such variables would have to be uncorrelated with all the control variables we include in the regression model and they would also have to explain the cross-sectional variation of the treatment effects. As pointed out by Claessens and Laeven (2003) , Lin et al. (2012) , and Raddatz (2006) , it is less likely to have an omitted variable correlated with the interaction term than with the linear term.
First, if the enhanced innovation after the law enactment is due to enhanced diversity in the workplace, we expect this treatment effect to be stronger in firms that do not have pro-gay nondiscrimination policies prior to the treatment. We obtain the information on firm-level pro-gay nondiscrimination policies from the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) ratings database, which covers approximately 650 companies that have comprised the Domini 400 Social SM Index and the S&P 500 index since 1991 and more than 3,000 companies that have comprised the Russell 3000 index since 2003. The KLD database provides an indicator variable to flag whether or not a firm has a pro-gay non-discrimination policy in a given year, and this policy indicates that the company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees.
We re-estimate Equation (2) by replacing the Pass indicator with Pass × Pro-gay and Pass × Non-pro-gay indicators. The Pro-gay indicator takes the value of one if the firm has a pro-gay non-discrimination policy prior to the passage of ENDAs, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the Non-pro-gay indicator is defined as (1− Pro-gay). Table 7 presents the results.
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The coefficients on Pass × Pro-gay are not significantly different from zero, while the coefficients on Pass × Non-pro-gay are positive and significant across all five columns. This result indicates that the effect of ENDAs on corporate innovation is significant for firms that previously had not adopted pro-gay non-discrimination policies, whereas it is virtually absent in firms that had done so. Table 7 is smaller than that in Table 3 . 11 Earlier survey information on the homosexual population is also available in the Census 1990 and Census 2000 data. The 2005 American Community Survey may provide a more accurate estimation of the homosexual population because more homosexual people have been willing to identify themselves in recent years (Gates, 2006 Lastly, considering that workplace diversity affects productivity associated with human capital, not physical capital, the treatment effects should be stronger for firms that rely more on human capital.
Following Coff (2002) , we measure human capital intensity as the number of knowledge workers as a proportion of all workers. We obtain data on employment levels from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Based on the OES occupational codebook, we define knowledge workers to be those with an occupational code below 50,000. This definition includes occupations such as managers, scientists, engineers, computer programmers, IT professionals, and so forth. The OES provides data on the breakdown of the total number of workers employed in each three-digit SIC industry. From the OES data, we calculate the proportion of the total workforce being knowledge workers for a given three-digit SIC industry, and then assign that measure to each focal firm in our sample. We then define the High human capital intensity indicator as one if the proportion of knowledge workers among all workers is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Then, the Low human capital intensity indicator is defined as (1− High human capital intensity). We re-estimate Taken together, the effects of ENDAs on corporate innovation are much stronger for firms that previously have not had pro-gay non-discrimination policies, for firms in a state with a large homosexual population, and for firms in human capital-intensive industries. These results suggest that the impact of ENDAs on corporate innovation is indeed tied to workforce diversity (with respective to sexual orientation) and is unlikely to be spuriously driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
Evidence on Inventors' Relocation
As discussed in Section 2, we expect that ENDAs affect innovation through the firm-employee matching channel. That is, pro-gay employees move into ENDA adopting states, while anti-gay employees move out. This matching process fosters innovation because pro-gay employees are usually younger, bettereducated, more tolerant, open-minded, and risk-taking (and thus more innovative) than anti-gay employees. In this section, we investigate this channel by exploiting inventors' relocation. We collect individual inventor data from the Harvard Business School Patent Dataverse, which provides information on both inventors (i.e., the persons who produce the patents) and assignees (i.e., companies that own the patents). We can thus track the mobility records of inventors across different firms.
We define an inventor as a new hire for firm i in year t if she files for her first patent in firm i in year t after filing a patent in a different firm. Similarly, we define an inventor as a leaver for firm i in year t if she previously filed patents for firm i but starts to file patents for another firm in year t. Then, we compute the number of leavers and the number of new hires for each firm in a given year. Table 10 reports the difference-in-differences tests that examine the impacts of ENDAs on inventors' relocation. The regression specification is the same as Equation (2), except that we use the measures of inventors' relocation as the dependent variables. In column (1), the dependent variable is Ln (1+ number of leaver) and the coefficient on the Pass indicator is positive and significant at the 1% level.
In column (2), the dependent variable is Ln (1+ number of new hire) and the coefficient on the Pass indicator is also positive and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that after the adoption of ENDAs, local firms experience more inventors moving in while more existing inventors move out in the meantime. We examine Ln (1+ number of net new hire) as the dependent variable in column (3), where the number of net new hire is the difference between the number of new hires and the number of leavers. 13 We find a significantly positive coefficient on the Pass indicator, suggesting that newly hired inventors still outnumber the leaving inventors. This result is broadly consistent with Martell (2014), who finds that ENDAs significantly increase the labor supply of homosexuals.
In columns (4) and (5), we further investigate the locations of new firms for the leaving inventors.
In column (4), we investigate the leavers whose new firm locates in a different state which has also adopted the ENDA. We find that the coefficient on the Pass indicator is not significantly different from zero. However, in column (5), we examine the leavers whose new firm locates in a different state which had not adopted the ENDA, and we find a positive and significant coefficient on the Pass indicator. Thus, the outflow of inventors following the enactment of ENDAs is mainly driven by the inventors who move to a state without such a law. This result suggests that the leavers are not comfortable with the state's adoption of the ENDA and they relocate to avoid this law.
In columns (6) and (7), we investigate the new hire's previous location. We separately examine the new hires from the states that have adopted ENDAs and from the states that haven't, respectively. We find that the coefficients on the Pass indicator are positive and significant in both columns, suggesting that the adoption of ENDAs helps local firms to hire inventors from both gay-friendly and gay-unfriendly states.
Finally, we investigate the productivity of the leaving and newly hired inventors in Table 11 . For each inventor, we track the patents filed (and eventually granted) by her, and the patent citations received by these patents over our sample period. On average, the leaving inventors have 10.56 patents in total during our sample period, while the newly hired inventors have 13.32 patents. The difference is significant at the 1% level. In terms of citations, the average leaving inventor receives 13.07 patent citations, while the average newly hired inventor has a significantly larger number (16.94). We obtain the same inference when comparing the median number of patents and patent citations. These results indicate that the individual productivity of the newly hired inventors is greater than that of leaving inventors, consistent with the conjecture that pro-gay employees are likely to be more creative than anti-gay employees.
Overall, Tables 10 and 11 provide supporting evidence that the mechanism through which the ENDAs affect innovation is the relocation of pro-gay employees (who are likely to be more creative) into the state and the relocation of the anti-gay employees (who are likely to be less creative) out of the state.
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Further Discussions
So far, we have provided evidence on the causal effect of ENDAs on corporate innovation. However, there are concerns that the adoption of ENDAs could be an endogenous decision and states choose to implement these laws. It may be that forward-thinking, progressive business leaders press states to pass such laws, and also such leaders invest in innovation. Thus, the mindset of business leaders (which is difficult to control in the regression) could be the true driving force. Even if the enactment of ENDAs is not prompted by any pressure from business leaders, it may be that the state is doing so as part of a general program to improve business conditions, and is thus accompanying ENDAs with other forwardthinking policies that may foster innovation. We believe that the above concerns are less likely to be valid for the following four reasons.
First, as we detailed in Section 3.2, the adoption of ENDAs largely depends on the support of political elites, and the relative strength of gay rights groups and opposition groups. To our best knowledge, there is no evidence showing that business leaders are major players in this legislation.
Second, throughout all the analysis, we have controlled for firm fixed effects. This should be able to control for the unobserved mindset of business leaders to some extent (as long as the business leaders are not changing their mindset very often). Third, the cross-sectional variation of the treatment effects in Section 5.5 indicates that the effect of ENDAs on corporate innovation is indeed tied to workplace diversity with respect to homosexuality. This helps to alleviate the omitted variable concern, because an omitted variable is more likely to be correlated with the linear term but less likely to be correlated with the interaction terms (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Lin et al., 2012; Raddatz, 2006) . Lastly, our analysis
in Section 5.6 shows that the enactment of ENDAs leads to a significant outflow of existing inventors from the adopting state to other states, especially to the states without ENDAs. This finding further suggests that ENDAs are unlikely to be correlated with any other statewide policies that intend to improve business conditions and foster innovation, because such "other policies" should help to retain existing inventors.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the effect of workplace diversity (with respect to sexual orientation) on business success from the perspective of innovation, and find that workplace diversity has a positive causal effect on corporate innovation. We exploit various exogenous shocks from the state-level adoption of ENDAs that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and study the changes in corporate innovation following these law changes. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find a significant increase in firms' patents and patent citations following the law changes, relative to firms in states that do not pass such laws. We further find that the impact of ENDAs on corporate innovation is more pronounced when the firms previously did not have a pro-gay non-discrimination policy in place, when the state has a large homosexual population, and when the firms rely more on human capital. Moreover, based on individual inventor information, we provide evidence that the mechanism through which ENDAs affect innovation is the matching between companies and employees.
That is, following the laws' enactment, more pro-gay employees (who are likely to be more creative) relocate into the state, while more anti-gay employees (who are likely to be less creative) relocate out of the state. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that an equal and inclusive workforce fosters creativity and innovation.
Our paper provides important implications not only for technology firms' hiring strategies, but also for public policies aimed at fostering innovation. Our results suggest that policies aimed to promote equal employment can have real economic effects in terms of improving corporate innovation. This finding is particularly timely and relevant because of the ongoing consideration of federal legislation to ban sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace across the nation.
Lastly, although our paper focuses on workplace diversity with respect to sexual orientation (for identification purposes), the same economic mechanisms apply for other types of diversity in the workplace, such as diversity on the basis of gender, race, ethnic background, age, etc. Examining the policies that aim to increase these types of diversity and create a more inclusive workplace could be an interesting area for future research.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Measures of Innovation Output
LnPat Natural logarithm of one plus firm's total number of patents filed (and subsequently granted).
LnCit
Natural logarithm of one plus firm's total number of citations received on the firm's patents filed. To adjust the citation count, each patent's number of citations is divided by the average citation count of all patents applied in the same year.
LnCit/pat Natural logarithm of one plus firm's average number of citations received on the firm's patents filed. If the firm filed no patents in that year, the missing value of average citation counts is set to zero.
LnPat/emp Natural logarithm of one plus firm's total number of patents filed (and subsequently granted), scaled by the number of the firm's employees.
LnCit/emp
Natural logarithm of one plus firm's total number of citations received on the firm's patents filed (and subsequently granted), scaled by the number of the firm's employees.
Firm Characteristics
Cash Cash and marketable securities normalized by the book value of total assets.
Firm size Natural logarithm of the number of employees.
Leverage
Total debt normalized by the book value of total asset. R&D R&D expenditures normalized by the book value of total assets. If R&D expenditures variable is missing, we set the missing value to zero.
Capex
Capital expenditures normalized by the book value of total assets.
ROA
Return on assets, measured as operating income normalized by the book value of total assets.
Firm age
Number of years since the firm's first appearance in CRSP.
Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity minus balance sheet deferred taxes, normalize by the book value of total assets.
Tangible Property, plant & equipment normalized by the book value of total assets.
Hindex
Herfindahl index is the sum of squared sales-based market shares of all firms in a three-digit SIC industry.
Pro-gay An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees, and zero otherwise.
Non-pro-gay 1−Pro-gay.
High human capital intensity
An indicator variable that takes the value of one for the firm whose proportion of knowledge workers among all workers is above the sample median, and zero otherwise.
Low human capital intensity 1− High human capital intensity.
State Characteristics
Pass An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a state has adopted the ENDA which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Ln(State GDP) Natural logarithm of annual state GDP.
Ln(Population) Natural logarithm of a state's population.
Ln(Colleges) Natural logarithm of the number of degree-granting institutions of higher education in a given state.
Ln(Enrollment) Natural logarithm of enrollment in institutions of higher education in a given state.
Political balance
The ratio of Republican-to-Democrat representatives in the Lower House (House of Representatives) for a given state.
High gay population state
An indicator variable that takes the value of one for the top ten states with the largest percentage of population that is gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and zero otherwise.
Low gay population state 1− High gay population state. This table examines whether the effect of ENDAs on innovation is confounded by unobserved changes in local business conditions. For each treated firm, we match to a control firm that is in the same industry, in a neighboring state without adopting the ENDA, and closest in distance. The indicator variable Pass takes the value of one if a state has adopted the ENDA which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in a given year, and zero otherwise. All the firm characteristics used in Table 3 are also included in this regression but unreported for brevity. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. The superscript ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Pro-gay) . The indicator variable Pass takes the value of one if a state has adopted the ENDA which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in a given year, and zero otherwise. All the firm characteristics used in Table 3 are also included in this regression but unreported for brevity. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. The superscript ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) This table reports the double difference-in-differences tests that examine the relative effects of ENDAs on corporate innovation in different industries based on the human capital intensity. The indicator variable High human capital intensity takes the value of one for the firms whose proportion of knowledge workers among all workers is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. Low human capital intensity is (1− High human capital intensity). The indicator variable Pass takes the value of one if a state has adopted the ENDA which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in a given year, and zero otherwise. All the firm characteristics used in Table 3 are also included in this regression but unreported for brevity. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. The superscript ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) ENDAs refers to the number of newly hired inventors who previously worked in another firm in a different state which has already adopted the ENDA. In column (7), the dependent variable is Ln (1+ New hire from states without ENDAs), where New hire from states without ENDAs refers to the number of newly hired inventors who previously worked in another firm in a different state which has not adopted the ENDA. The indicator variable Pass takes the value of one if a state has adopted the ENDA which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in a given year, and zero otherwise. All the firm characteristics used in Table 3 are also included in this regression but unreported for brevity. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. The superscript ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Year relative to the adoption of employment anti-discrimination laws LnPat LnCit
